



SMART GRID PROTECTION AGAINST CYBER ATTACKS

Security Analytics

Smart Grid Anomaly Detection



Symposium on Innovative Smart Grid Cybersecurity Solutions, Vienna, Mar 2017

Dr. Niamh O'Mahony, DELL EMC Research Europe, Ireland




The System

Smart Grid Infrastructure




- Home
- Electrical
- CHP
- Wind Turbine
- Battery
- Boilerhouse
- Norm. Settings
- HistData
- Trending
- Alarms
- Print
- Control
- Log


SCADA & BMS (8 electrical meters + thermal ...)



Lighting



Lab



The Attacker



Attack Objectives

Damage Equipment

Disrupt Service

Increase Costs



Attack Objectives

Damage Equipment

Disrupt Service

Increase Costs

MAXIMISE IMPACT



Attack Flow

Gain Entry

Extract Information & Gain Knowledge

Intercept Variables & Commands

Manipulate Data



Attack Flow

Gain Entry

Extract Information & Gain Knowledge

Intercept Variables & Commands


Manipulate Data

NIDS

Security Analytics



“Man-in-the-middle” attacks



The Solution

Knowledge-Based Anomaly Detection


P = VI



Data-Driven Anomaly Detection



SPARKS Security Analytics





Data Directory:

BMSdata


File to analyze:

Day/BMS20160208.csv

Plot length (hours)



Update Rate (mins/sec)



Run Analysis

Summary

Schematic

Sensor Data

Rules



METERS
15



SVM ANOMALIES
3




KB ANOMALIES
4




MISSING SAMPLES
1.76 %

Standard Anomaly Detector (Rule-based)




Advanced Anomaly Detector (Machine Learning)



Performance (Simulation)

- Sensitivity:
 - *Maximum deviation that can be achieved by attacker without detection*
- Usability:
 - *Expected time to false alarm*
- SVM detectors outperform KB
 - lower max dev for same $E[T_{fa}]$



DALLEMC



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