



This project has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 608090.



Identifying and Managing Risks in Interconnected Utility Networks

The HyRiM Risk Management Process

Stefan Schauer

Smart Grid Symposium

Vienna, 13.03.2017



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Contents



- Motivation
- Risk Management and the ISO 31000
- HyRiM Risk Management Process
- Conclusion



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Motivation



- Risk assessment and risk management is a **core duty** for utility providers
 - Utility providers operate **critical infrastructures**
 - Responsible for the supply of large number of people with different goods
 - Incidents within/affecting utility providers might have **huge economic and societal impacts**
- Numerous risk assessment and risk management tools already exist
 - Based on **well-established standards and guidelines** (e.g. ISO 31000)
 - Often focusing on a **specific field** (e.g. IT Security – ISO 27005, Supply Chain Management – ISO 28000, Port Security – ISO 20858)
 - Often **designed for businesses** and not the special requirements of utility providers or critical infrastructures
 - Mostly a matter of best practices




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Motivation

- Networks operated by utility providers are **heavily connected** among each other
 - Utility network (e.g. power lines, water pipes, oil pipelines, etc.)
 - Control networks (e.g. SCADA networks, smart grids, etc.)
 - ICT networks (e.g. office networks, communication networks, intranet, etc.)





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ISO 31000




- World-wide **leading standard for risk management** is the ISO 31000
 - Follows a very **generic approach** on risk management
 - Ubiquitously **applicable on every kind of organisation**
 - More specific standards are **building on and extending** the ISO 31000 (e.g., ISO 27005, ISO 28000, ISO 20858, etc.)
- ISO 31000 describes a two-tier structure
 - **Operative risk management process** provides a generic description of the different steps towards risk management
 - **Organizational risk management framework** required to implement the risk management process within a company
- In HyRiM we extend the ISO 31000 towards a **more mathematically-based** approach, including **concepts and algorithms** developed in the project



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ISO 31000





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HyRiM RM Process



- Requirements of utility providers have **changed**
 - Number of **cyber-physical systems** increases (e.g., SCADA networks, Industrial Control Systems)
 - Threats evolve **more rapidly** and become **more complex** (e.g., Advanced Persistent Threats – APT)
 - Intentional threats became more popular in recent years (e.g., terrorism, cyber-terrorism/hacktivists, espionage, etc.)
- Threats affecting one part of a utility provider can **propagate through the network** and **affect other, distant parts**, too
 - Malware infection on the ICT network might cause the failure of a SCADA system and thus affect the utility network itself
 - Security issue of a SCADA system might give access to business data handled in the ICT network
- Additionally, utility providers are **interconnected and interacting** with each other



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HyRiM RM Process




- Novel approaches towards security and risk management have to be identified to address these issues
 - Solutions for each network level exist and are applied separately
 - “Hybrid” risk management methodologies are required, providing a holistic overview (i.e. looking at several networks simultaneously)
 - Interconnections and the related cascading effects need to be considered
- Sole focus on technical threats and technical solutions is no longer adequate
 - Social engineering is a major aspect in many attack strategies
 - Organizational factors are essential for every security measure or security strategy performed in an organization
- Security and risk management methodologies explicitly have to take societal factors into account



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HyRiM RM Process





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Conclusion



- Utility operators live in a highly **uncertain environment**
 - More **complex and rapidly changing** threat landscape
 - Consequences of events are not assessed easily (e.g., **cascading effects**)
- Standard risk assessment and risk management process are **often not enough**
- Novel risk management process developed in the HyRiM project
 - Extension of the standard ISO 31000 process
 - Strongly relying on **qualitative data/information**
 - Application of **mathematical tools** and **structured approaches**
 - Implementation of **game theory** to identify optimal mitigation actions
- Goal is to support the **operational and management level** to make better decisions



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


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- **BACK-UP: Details on the HyRiM RM Process**



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Process Overview





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Establishing the Context



- Identify all interrelations with **internal and external stakeholders**
 - Internal **technical, organizational and social aspects** (e.g., communication channels, dependencies between different technical and social networks)
 - External **interrelations and interdependencies** (e.g., external organizations as resource providers or regulatory bodies)
- Identify the relevant **framework** for the risk management process
 - Parts of the organization which are **covered in the risk management process** (e.g., organizational units, depth of the risk assessment process)
 - Criteria to **evaluate the significance** of a specific risk based on organization's resources, objectives and goals or general characteristics (e.g., definition how the likelihood or the impact of an event is characterized)



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Risk Identification



- Identify the **relevant assets** of the organization's infrastructure
 - Based on the internal context (cf. "Context Establishment")
 - Focus on the interconnections between assets
- Identify all **potential threats** and **respective vulnerabilities** affecting the organization's infrastructure
 - Obtain a structured view on all potential threats and vulnerabilities
 - Application of a specific Threat Awareness Architecture
- Information can/should be collected from **different sources**
 - External (e.g., existing **threat catalogues** or online **threat databases**)
 - Internal (e.g., **expert knowledge** or **information on past incidents**)



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Risk Analysis



- Identify a fine-grained list of **potential threat scenarios**
- Determine the **potential consequences** for the manifestation of all threat scenarios
 - **Quantitative** (e.g., using **percolation theory** or a **co-simulation approach**)
 - **Qualitative** (e.g., by **experts** from within the organization or **external advisors**)
- Determine the **potential likelihood** for the manifestation of all threat scenarios
 - In general **fully qualitative estimation** supported using information from external sources (e.g., reports containing statistical information on the likelihood of specific events)
- All information is gathered in **histograms or distribution functions**
 - Capturing of uncertainty and preventing loss of information




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
Risk Analysis



Damage (Distribution)



Damage (Histogram)





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Risk Evaluation



- Select a list of **most relevant risks** (based on threat scenarios)
- Determine a **ranking** of the identified risks
 - Ordering according to their respective consequences and likelihood
 - Comparing histograms is non-trivial (novel approach has been identified)
- Create a **graphical representation** and a **priority list** of the identified risks
 - Each risk is placed within a **risk matrix** based on its consequences and likelihood
 - Risks having the most severe consequences together with the highest likelihood are located at the upper right corner of the matrix




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Risk Evaluation



ranking (w.r.t. \leq -ascending order)

	1	2	...	r_i	...	r_j	...	m
Impact:			T_2			T_1		T_3
Likelihood:			T_2	T_1	T_3			





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Risk Treatment



- Identify the risks that need to be mitigated
 - Usually these are the **highest-ranked risks**
 - Threat scenarios describe **potential attack strategies** for these risks
- Identify possible **mitigation actions** (defense strategies) to counter the respective attack strategies
 - Reducing the consequences of the specific risk (e.g., by lowering the number of affected assets)
 - Reducing the likelihood of the specific risk (e.g., by making it harder to exploit specific vulnerabilities)
 - Letting a risk vanish completely (e.g., by closing specific vulnerabilities)



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Risk Treatment



- Determine the **effect of a specific defense strategy** on a single attack strategy
 - Rerunning the consequence analysis for the organization's asset structure (assume that the specific defense strategy has been implemented)
 - Evaluate all possible combinations of attack and defense strategies
 - Results are fed into the game-theoretic framework
- **Game-theoretic framework** provides an **optimal security strategy**
 - In general a **mixture of the single mitigation actions**
 - Describes the different frequencies at which these mitigation actions have to be performed
 - Organizational structure (job scheduling) is required to support the correct implementation of the mitigation actions