On the evening of 13th March a social dinner will be held at the Ottakringer Brewery in the 16th District of Vienna. Prior to the dinner, starting at 19:30, there will be a poster session, allowing researchers to present their ongoing research to symposium participants in a relaxed and social setting – a perfect opportunity to gather feedback on your latest research findings. Please see below the posters that will be presented during this session, and instructions on how to get to the brewery.
Cyber Security of Intelligent Power Grids: Vulnerability Assessment under Combined Data Attacks
Kaikai Pan, André M. H. Teixeira, Peter Palensky, TU Delft
Abstract — This work introduces combined data integrity and availability attacks to expand the attack scenarios against intelligent power grids. We propose security metrics that quantify vulnerability of power grids to combined data attacks under both power system models and communication models. The security metrics can be formulated as optimization problems. The relation between the security metrics of combined data attacks and pure data integrity attacks will be analyzed. Furthermore, co-simulation techniques will be employed to measure consequences of combined data attacks.
Data Attacks in Wide Area Monitoring System
Sarita Paudel and Paul Smith, AIT Austrian Institute of Technology; Tanja Zseby, Technische Universität Wien
Abstract — A smart grid integrates Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and incorporates new functions into electricity grid monitoring and control systems. Wide Area Monitoring Systems (WAMSs) provide real-time monitoring of the system by measuring synchrophasor data from different locations. A WAMS provides an essential building block for supervision and control. Data integrity attacks in WAMS can trigger wrong decisions and create dangerous failures in the smart grid system and can have severe impacts on grid stability, overall power supply, and physical devices. This work motivates the investigation of WAMS security issues, discuss data integrity attacks and existing methodologies.
Privacy Enhancing Technologies for the Smart Building Domain
Stephan Cejka, Felix Knorr, Lukas Krammer and Daniel Lechner, Siemens AG Corporate Technology
Abstract — In today’s building automation systems, high amounts of data are collected in order to optimize costs and reduce energy consumption. Some of these data can directly or indirectly be related to an individual person, leading to a possible privacy infringement. Therefore, special care has to be taken in order to protect personal data and privacy. Furthermore, the use of personal data is restricted by law. This article addresses some of the issues and gives possible solutions. As privacy issues introduced by Smart Meters are tightly connected and have been heavily discussed in literature, this work will use them as the main example for describing privacy preserving solutions.
Reference Architecture as Foundation for Risk and Threat Analysis
Marcus Meisel et al., Technische Universität Wien
Abstract — The project “Reference Architecture for Secure Smart Grids Austria” (RASSA) is developing a foundation for secure, interoperable architecture components dedicated for future smart grids in Austria. A key feature of this blueprint is its tool supported model driven design approach, enabling users to estimate the risk of components introduced into the models as a decision base for a deeper threat analysis. The design of this architecture is carried out in close coordination with all relevant stakeholders from Austria through an established stakeholder process supported by “Technologieplattform Smart Grids Austria” (TPSGA). During the RASSA-architecture project, parts of the reference architecture will be instantiated to validate relevant smart grid components. This paper shows the progress of this undertaking and illustrates the potential of integrating reactive and active security attributes within a reference architecture.
Security Concepts in a Distributed Middleware for Smart Grid Applications
Stephan Cejka and Albin Frischenschlager, Siemens AG, Corporate Technology; Mario Faschang and Mark Stefan, AIT Austrian Institute of Technology
Abstract — Novel software applications are developed and used in order to take full advantage of Smart Grid and Smart City infrastructures. In our concrete Smart City field trial, a distributed middleware is used to connect such interacting Smart Grid applications. This work presents a threat analysis for this middleware-based communication containing six potential attack patterns. As countermeasure against the potential attacks, we present the security concept for the interacting Smart Grid applications consisting of the middleware’s encryption layer and trusted applications.
Cyber Attack Awareness through Evidential Network Modelling and State Inference
Ivo Friedberg and Paul Smith, AIT Austrian Institute of Technology; Kieran McLaughlin, Queen’s University Belfast
Abstract — Cyber-physical systems inherit the high dependability requirements of the underlying physical process while security threats from the cyber domain are introduced. To ensure safety requirements, an accurate response to cyber attacks is necessary. State awareness is one major enabler for such a response. However, it requires the integration of existing sensor solutions which is often a challenge. This work proposes to apply evidential networks in order to integrate information from arbitrary system sensors. The presented results show that the combination of sensors allows the inference of high level system states with high accuracy. This information can then be used to prevent future system errors. The approach is evaluated on a microgrid scenario and the results are compared to existing work in the field.
Modeling of Cyber-physical Systems Using a Complex Network Approach
Wentao Zhu and Jovica V. Milanović, The University of Manchester
Abstract — This extended abstract presented a three-dimensional weighted Complex Network Theory (CNT) model to study the dependency and interdependency of cyber-physical systems (CPS) and to identify the most critical and vulnerable components within the coupled network. Four CNT-derived indices, Node Degree, Betweenness Centrality, Efficiency, and Vulnerability-weighted Node Degree have been applied to the assessment of criticality of each CPS component. The importance of each system component is ranked, allowing time-critical feasible solutions to be delivered. The approach is illustrated on a 14-bus synthetic distribution network with supporting ICT infrastructure.
A Malware-Tolerant, Self-Healing Industrial Control System Framework
Michael Denzel, Mark Ryan and Eike Ritter, University of Birmingham
Abstract — Industrial Control System (ICS) are computers managing many critical infrastructures like power plants, aeroplanes, production lines, etc. While ICS were specialised hardware circuits in former times, they are nowadays commodity computers with network connection, TCP/IP stack, and a full operating system, making them vulnerable to common attacks. The defensive mechanisms, however, are still lacking behind due to the strong requirement for availability of ICSs which prohibits to deploy typical countermeasures like e.g. an anti-virus. New techniques are needed to defend these systems under their distinct prerequisites.
We introduce the concept of a malware-tolerant ICS network architecture which can still operate securely even when some components are entirely compromised by an attacker. This was done by replacing all single point-of-failures with multiple components verifying each other. We provide ProVerif proofs to show the correctness of the network protocol one-by-one assuming each device compromised.
Furthermore, we added a self-healing mechanism based on invariants to the architecture on network as well as system level which will reset failed or compromised systems. To demonstrate system level self-healing, we implemented it on top of FreeRTOS and ARM TrustZone. The network level self-healing was incorporated into the ProVerif proofs by formally verifying the absence of type 1 (falsely identified attacks) and type 2 errors (missed attacks).
Opportunities and risks of the digitalization of power systems
Mariela Tapia and Stefan Gößling-Reisemann, University of Bremen
Abstract — The increase of complexity and scale of information and communication technologies (ICT) for power supply system has allowed the development of new monitoring, control and operation strategies to enhance the performance of the system. However, from a security perspective, this convergence represents a larger surface for possible cyber-attacks.
The research project Strom-Resilienz aims at identifying the properties, structures and elements of future power systems that are critical to their vulnerability in the context of cybersecurity. Furthermore, this research seeks to develop innovative resilience design options for smart grids to ensure the system’s primary functionality is maintained, even under stress.
The present work will describe the vulnerability assessment methodology approach used to identify internal and external perturbations in regards of cyber-security, the system’s exposure to this perturbations, as well as adaptive mechanisms in order to prevent or cope with them. The results from this assessment will be used as starting point to define a resilience strategy in order to identify how future power systems based on a large share of fluctuating renewable sources could be better prepared not only from already expected perturbations, but also from unforeseeable ones.
Tools and Methodologies for Dynamic Studies in Coupled Critical Infrastructure Systems
Yushi Chen and Jovica V.Milanović, University of Manchester
Abstract — Integration of critical infrastructures contributes to an increasing complexity and heterogeneity of their interdependencies. When external disturbances like natural disasters and intentional attacks take place, induced cascading failures are more likely to happen in large scale than they used to be. Their propagation paths and time-dependent behaviours are largely unknown to the area researchers and apparently it is difficult to model its mechanisms in an overarching way. This poster is presenting critical appraisal of existing methodologies for modelling cascading failures in interconnected systems. General explanations of the most widely used methodologies are firstly illustrated with the emphasis on their advantages and disadvantages and with the aim of choosing appropriate modelling and simulation methods for study of cascading failures in coupled electric power grids and telecommunication systems.
Ottakringer Brewery Address
Ottakringer Platz 1, 1160 Vienna, Austria
The location room is called Gold Fassl Magazin. Signs are available on the premises of the Brewery
Directions using Public Transport
The Ottakringer Brewery is reachable via Tram 2 Station “Johann Nepomuk-Berger-Platz” or Tram 46 Station “Thaliastraße/Feßtgasse”. You can reach the two Tram lines using these Metro Lines:
U1 (red line):
- Change at Karlsplatz
- Take exit Oper, look for sign “2 Ottakringer Straße”
- Take the Tram 2 in direction Ottakringer Straße
- Leave at the station Johann-Nepomuk-Berger-Platz
- Walk across the Feßtgasse to the Main Entrance (middle of Feßtgasse)
U3 (orange line):
- Change at Volkstheater
- Take exit to Tram 46 (it is the end and beginning station of this tram)
- Leave at station Thaliastraße/Feßtgasse
- Walk along Feßtgasse, in the middle there is the Main Entrance
U6 (brown line):
- Change at Thaliastraße
- Take the Tram 46 in direction Ottakringer Straße and proceed as described in B)
U6 (brown line) and walk
- Take the U6
- Leave at station Josefstädter Straße